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Iran’s Nuclear Ambition
Scientist Moderator
digs 
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Posted 10/19/09 , edited 10/19/09
@Ryu- I'll respond more adequately to your post tomorrow. It's late here and I should go to bed :3 One thing I need to clarify is this

You said 'even fellow muslims' because I am a muslim? That won't make me divert myself, as I see the root of it.


I am not trying to use your faith to manipulate or divert you. What I mean in those statements is how the Shia Muslims treat the Sunni. By this I mean "fellow" because they are of the same religion, just different sects. I am referring to the Iranian's Islamic government and how it treats "fellow" Muslims with fellow being the government and Muslims being Sunni and other branches. I am in no way trying to use your faith to entice, manipulate, or play on your emotions. Even though we disagree I still respect you and I just wanted to clarify that statement before I went to bed. I apologize if my statements sounded offensive or rude towards you and I hope this clarifies things. I'll post more in response to what you wrote tomorrow. Have a good day/night!
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Posted 10/20/09

digs wrote:

@Ryu- I'll respond more adequately to your post tomorrow. It's late here and I should go to bed :3 One thing I need to clarify is this

You said 'even fellow muslims' because I am a muslim? That won't make me divert myself, as I see the root of it.


I am not trying to use your faith to manipulate or divert you. What I mean in those statements is how the Shia Muslims treat the Sunni. By this I mean "fellow" because they are of the same religion, just different sects. I am referring to the Iranian's Islamic government and how it treats "fellow" Muslims with fellow being the government and Muslims being Sunni and other branches. I am in no way trying to use your faith to entice, manipulate, or play on your emotions. Even though we disagree I still respect you and I just wanted to clarify that statement before I went to bed. I apologize if my statements sounded offensive or rude towards you and I hope this clarifies things. I'll post more in response to what you wrote tomorrow. Have a good day/night!


I think I'm the one who should apologizing. When I read my post again, I think it's kinda harsh. Yeah, I'm aware of Sunni and Shiah/ Shi'ite differences and the way they practice Islam are different in some way. But for me, Islam is Islam, no differences. They were divided just because of political motives when Prophet Muhammad died. I've read the history about it, although it might a bit vague as I haven't read all the books of Islam history.

Also, I'd like to say sorry of my language or writing because I just noticed there are many grammar and spelling mistake in my post. I hope you get what I meant . Please don't hesitate to ask if you don't get my post because of my grammar or spelling mistake.

And what we've been talk is way off topic. I think we should save those other matters to different topic about Israel-Palestine, Taliban - Hamas - US invasion - Iran's social. So we can focus only to Iran's nuclear because Seraph was kind enough to make this topic so we can talk about it properly, not to other matters.

I'd like to express my gratitude for your manner, although in this case I'm the one who lacks manner, (=_=") Yes, this is how discussion should be, not like another person who is really childish just because my age and liked to divert the whole topic entirely, also being selfish in his post. I've been enjoyed discuss with you, although it'll be nice if we stay focus on Iran's nuclear only. Thank you ^‿‿^
Posted 10/21/09

Ryutai-Desk wrote:


DomFortress wrote:

Now do tell me, is that your love or your hatred that compelled you to say those things about me? When all is fair in love and hate. And that's why you'll never understand me, when you simply incapable of love such as you are.

Not only that, you let your hatred warped your senses, so that when you cherry-picked my source, you couldn't even see this:



It wasn't for me, nor from my love or hate. All of them were from your own arrogance based on your last statement when you said your irresponsible statement by saying "I don't care a rat's ass what Iran want to do with themselves.", "They can do whatever that they want. The Iranian president can keep talking. and people like me are not obligated to listen", "When it's my rights not listening to who I don't believe in.".
Isn't this just selfish? Not willing to understand and listening Iran's effort to embrace all nations and always ready to talk head to head to make deeper understanding about its nuclear.

Because of your irresponsible statement, I said those careless statement too. By saying that meant, "If you don't want to listen, then leave this matter. We don't need ignorant people who can't form trust, tolerance and love between us. Instead, you make destruction and make a peace deal and Memorandum of Understanding." that's why I said, who are you anyway?
Don't want to listen? Leave, save your energy. Want to listen? Come and discuss it together without being biased.

of course, you don't understand my love. Because your form of love is different. My love is to embrace all nations on the world regardless their stance, whether left or right, as long as they're willing to cooperate and contribute to any deal, including nuclear programme and peace. Meanwhile, your love is only based on baseless statement and merely accusing another nation for having nuclear that have been following IAEA regulations. So, what kind of love you have, when you don't even want to listen to Iran?

I've said it in my previous post that Russia has no power to stop Iran's intention to make Nuclear Power when they've fulfilled IAEA regulations. Well, even though Russia and China do not want Iran to enrich their nuclear, who the heck do they think they are? Want to put sanctions to Iran? Iran has been under tight sanction from begin with. After all, rights to have Nuclear plant is not through UN Founding Member, but through UN itself and procedure from IAEA. Could care less what Russia and China think when every country has right to have nuclear energy.


DomFortress wrote:

In order to further conceal their nuclear enrichment program, Iran used Chinese engineering companies as fronts and loopholes for their nuclear black market. When Iran were already under strict nuclear sanctions by the UN in 2006:


The resolution demands that Tehran end all uranium enrichment work, which can produce fuel for nuclear plants as well as for bombs.

The vote by the 15-member council took place exactly two months after Britain, France and Germany first introduced a draft resolution proposing sanctions.

The draft resolution was amended several times after objections from both the Russians and Chinese.

But after parts of the resolution were watered down, both Russia and China - who have close financial ties with Iran - backed the proposals.


Of course, I'll be once again expecting to hear your hateful comments because I love you. When I don't care about Iran because I don't love them nor hate them, while I'm angry at what they did is wrong.


Then, UN should also questioning China for agreeing to cooperate with Iran. Why they let loose to Russia and China, while both nations also helping Iran to build Nuclear Facility? Because of political influence in UN Security Council? It's not fair, if UN only put sanctions to Iran, while Russia and China were working together.

It's not hatred, that was based on your irresponsible statement based on your personal opinion. You don't want to listen to Iran, then you don't have right to oppose them. Because Iran has rights to give explanation to the world of their nuclear, then we listen them, analyze the matters deeply and make understanding from both sides based on expert's analysis. Not because of personal opinion and political interest, that's why this problem won't be solved forever unless, they really have will to talk to each other.

Here is the Draft of Consideration to launch Nuclear Programme. US and Europe should talk to Iran peacefully based on this draft and IAEA. Not merely accusing them.



DomFortress wrote:


drizza wrote:

To me it would be wrong to put sanctions on Iran for doing absolutely nothing.


Still think that Iran did nothing wrong? When they obviously broke the 2006 UN nuclear sanctions with their nuclear black market, and hid an underground nuclear enrichment site from IAEA until 2002.

Besides, if Iran was friendly with Israel to begin with, do you think they should be hiding anything regarding their nuclear program at all? When they're obviously a member state under the NPT just like the US, while Israel is not.


You still keep repeating the same thing. Read again.

Iran is under no legal obligation to provide the information until 180-days before the introduction of nuclear material into the site. THAT is the applicable standard, and there's no evidence that Iran has violated that standard.

In the past, as part of Iran's ill-fated negotiations with the Eu-3, Iran agreed to TEMPORARILY provide such information quicker -- however when the negotiations fell apart Iran returned to abiding ONLY by its strict legal obligations.

The bottom line is that Iran has NOT "broken rules" and is in fact abiding by them by disclosing this site. Furthermost, this site is not a threat since it isn't even operational yet, and once it becomes operational it will be under IAEA safeguards since Iran declared it. And finally, it is PILOT enrichment site which means it can't be used to mass produce enriched uranium for bombs.

In fact, Iran's enrichment program as a whole was NEVER a secret and was widely announced on national radio in the 1980s
.

You still don't understand that NPT is biding all nations to ensure peaceful purpose of their nuclear, ease the tensions between nations and to accept safeguards from IAEA.
Here is the list of Nation that reported have nuclear power and their obligations to follow IAEA.
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf102.html

You don't even try to understand nuclear technology for yourself, and here you are calling me being "bias" and "not willing to listen". When the Iranian president himself can hardly tell the difference between uranium and plutonium, never mind the Iranian nuclear enrichment program. Therefore I don't believe him, nor his religion. When neither one of them can help me understand the Iranian nuclear ambition.

So what's wrong for me to seek out the truth for myself, by looking up what Iran did in order to get their nuclear enrichment program? And guess what, you never once came up with any of those information willingly. Therefore just who exactly here is refusing to acknowledge with the status qua? When you're doing exactly what Iran is doing; hiding behind an international treaty, making excuses with their religion, black marketing around their sanction. All for concealing their true nuclear ambition by deceiving the global community.

Nuclear power plant is the only equivalent of peaceful nuclear energy, not nuclear fuel enrichment nor medical radioactive isotopes. When current medical radioactive isotopes are made of 20% enriched nuclear fuel, which itself is too much for nuclear power plant, while its half-life is too short to for long-term storage. Medical radioactive isotopes OTOH are simply poisonous materials, that's preventing the spread of cancer by destroying the surrounding normal tissues.

Also, you didn't even touch the 2006 nuclear sanctions on Iran. Otherwise, why Iran need to rely on private Chinese engineering companies and not directly through the Chinese government, to smuggle nuclear enriching equipments which they later claimed to be made domestically?

Not to mention is the fact that none of those nations have their own nuclear enrichment program due to IAEA regulation. So why is Iran incinerating the international tension by them fulfilling their nuclear ambition of nuclear fuel enrichment? When there's no mentioning of an IAEA regulated nuclear enrichment plant within the NPP framework.
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Posted 10/21/09

DomFortress wrote:

You don't even try to understand nuclear technology for yourself, and here you are calling me being "bias" and "not willing to listen". When the Iranian president himself can hardly tell the difference between uranium and plutonium, never mind the Iranian nuclear enrichment program. Therefore I don't believe him, nor his religion. When neither one of them can help me understand the Iranian nuclear ambition.

So what's wrong for me to seek out the truth for myself, by looking up what Iran did in order to get their nuclear enrichment program? And guess what, you never once came up with any of those information willingly. Therefore just who exactly here is refusing to acknowledge with the status qua? When you're doing exactly what Iran is doing; hiding behind an international treaty, making excuses with their religion, black marketing around their sanction. All for concealing their true nuclear ambition by deceiving the global community.

Nuclear power plant is the only equivalent of peaceful nuclear energy, not nuclear fuel enrichment nor medical radioactive isotopes. When current medical radioactive isotopes are made of 20% enriched nuclear fuel, which itself is too much for nuclear power plant, while its half-life is too short to for long-term storage. Medical radioactive isotopes OTOH are simply poisonous materials, that's preventing the spread of cancer by destroying the surrounding normal tissues.

Also, you didn't even touch the 2006 nuclear sanctions on Iran. Otherwise, why Iran need to rely on private Chinese engineering companies and not directly through the Chinese government, to smuggle nuclear enriching equipments which they later claimed to be made domestically?

Not to mention is the fact that none of those nations have their own nuclear enrichment program due to IAEA regulation. So why is Iran incinerating the international tension by them fulfilling their nuclear ambition of nuclear fuel enrichment? When there's no mentioning of an IAEA regulated nuclear enrichment plant within the NPP framework.


That was merely your personal opinion, that's why I said that. Now let's talk with proper manner and focusing the matter on table.
Would you explain it first, what's the difference of it and why it's related to Iran's nuclear? Do you mind to explain the difference of Uranium 235 and Uranium 238 and why Plutonium 239 is very much like Uranium 235 if you know it better than us?

I've already explained many things based on the truth with valid evidence. If you don't mind, which information you meant? Is there any status Quo? If I missed saomething, kindly remind me. They're not hiding it, it just the rules was being changed and therefore it's not obligated to Iran with reasons I've explained. Now, where's the deception from Iran while they already followed IAEA regulations with the links and explanation I provided you?

Of course, they don't use all of it for medical purposes only, but also for electricity which is one of the main reasons the had it. Not to mention, there are many usage of RadioIsotope in many factors, such as preservation of food, crops, Industry and for environment. I haven't heard Iran said, they're gonna to use their Nuclear for medical purpose ONLY.

Of course it's to ensure China safety from International pressure by providing this flaw. I think, China government won't allow any priate company that not under their control to have such dangerous thing as Nuclear when the situation in China is in heat caused by minor region demanding to gain Independence. If they allowed such private company holding nuclear facility, it most likely suspucious to be handed over to minority region to armed themselves to oppose China government. It is a precaution being prepared beforehand in case something happened, and they were right.

Have you actually read the treaty?
Third Pillar
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has called the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities the "Achilles' heel" of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. As of 2007 13 states have an enrichment capability. Because the availability of fissile material has long been considered the principal obstacle to, and "pacing element" for, a country's nuclear weapons development effort, it was declared a major emphasis of U.S. policy in 2004 to prevent the further spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing (a.k.a. "ENR") technology.

Countries possessing ENR capabilities, it is feared, have what is in effect the option of using this capability to produce fissile material for weapons use. The degree to which NPT members have a right to ENR technology notwithstanding its potentially grave proliferation implications with being supported by Article IV which is :


Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.



ENR = Enrichment Plutonium Reprocessing technology which is already being mentioned in mentioned in Third Pillars and written in Article IV

Where there's no mention when it's really cleary stated in Article IV of NPT and its Third Pillar?
Posted 10/21/09 , edited 10/21/09

Ryutai-Desk wrote:
That was merely your personal opinion, that's why I said that. Now let's talk with proper manner and focusing the matter on table.
Would you explain it first, what's the difference of it and why it's related to Iran's nuclear? Do you mind to explain the difference of Uranium 235 and Uranium 238 and why Plutonium 239 is very much like Uranium 235 if you know it better than us?

I've already explained many things based on the truth with valid evidence. If you don't mind, which information you meant? Is there any status Quo? If I missed saomething, kindly remind me. They're not hiding it, it just the rules was being changed and therefore it's not obligated to Iran with reasons I've explained. Now, where's the deception from Iran while they already followed IAEA regulations with the links and explanation I provided you?

Of course, they don't use all of it for medical purposes only, but also for electricity which is one of the main reasons the had it. Not to mention, there are many usage of RadioIsotope in many factors, such as preservation of food, crops, Industry and for environment.
I haven't heard Iran said, they're gonna to use their Nuclear for medical purpose ONLY.

Of course it's to ensure China safety from International pressure by providing this flaw. I think, China government won't allow any priate company that not under their control to have such dangerous thing as Nuclear when the situation in China is in heat caused by minor region demanding to gain Independence. If they allowed such private company holding nuclear facility, it most likely suspucious to be handed over to minority region to armed themselves to oppose China government. It is a precaution being prepared beforehand in case something happened, and they were right.

Have you actually read the treaty?
Third Pillar
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has called the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities the "Achilles' heel" of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. As of 2007 13 states have an enrichment capability. Because the availability of fissile material has long been considered the principal obstacle to, and "pacing element" for, a country's nuclear weapons development effort, it was declared a major emphasis of U.S. policy in 2004 to prevent the further spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing (a.k.a. "ENR") technology.

Countries possessing ENR capabilities, it is feared, have what is in effect the option of using this capability to produce fissile material for weapons use. The degree to which NPT members have a right to ENR technology notwithstanding its potentially grave proliferation implications with being supported by Article IV which is :

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.


ENR = Enrichment Plutonium Reprocessing technology which is already being mentioned in mentioned in Third Pillars and written in Article IV

Where there's no mention when it's really cleary stated in Article IV of NPT and its Third Pillar?

Read it again, I was referring to the IAEA's regulated NPP as in the Consideration to Launch a Nuclear Power Program. Not the UN international treaty known as the NPT that you've been shielding Iran with.

If the Chinese government has nothing to do with how Iran obtained their equipments for nuclear enrichment program after the 2006 nuclear enrichment sanction on Iran by the UN. Then why did you complain here that:

Ryutai-Desk wrote:I've said it in my previous post that Russia has no power to stop Iran's intention to make Nuclear Power when they've fulfilled IAEA regulations. Well, even though Russia and China do not want Iran to enrich their nuclear, who the heck do they think they are? Want to put sanctions to Iran? Iran has been under tight sanction from begin with. After all, rights to have Nuclear plant is not through UN Founding Member, but through UN itself and procedure from IAEA. Could care less what Russia and China think when every country has right to have nuclear energy.

Then, UN should also questioning China for agreeing to cooperate with Iran. Why they let loose to Russia and China, while both nations also helping Iran to build Nuclear Facility? Because of political influence in UN Security Council? It's not fair, if UN only put sanctions to Iran, while Russia and China were working together.
Both China and Russia helped Iran to complete two nuclear power programs respectively in 1991 and 2006, when the planning of those NPP were already under the IAEA regulations. And since there's no such thing as an IAEA regulated nuclear enrichment program for member states under the NPT agreement, the 180 days notification is only for IAEA regulated nuclear power program. Especially when the IAEA modified their safeguard in 1991 and requested the NPT members of none-nuclear weapon states to report their nuclear program facilities during the planning stage. While only NPT members of nuclear weapon states were to voluntarily report their nuclear facilities during the planning stage.

Is Iran a nuclear weapon state under their NPT agreement, yes or no? If so, just what are their IAEA safeguard under Article III of their NPT agreement?

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
This means that Iran never completely fulfill their NPT agreement, when they suspended the implementation of IAEA safeguard within their legislation in 2006; a suspension which the IAEA claimed never agreed upon.

How can radioactive isotopes, which are poisonous materials, can be used as preservatives? When food irradiation is a natural process of making dried foods using sunlight and dry air, or a simple microwave oven. Not to mention is the fact that the radioactive isotope used for commercial food irradiation is Cobalt-60. When the theoretical application of Cesium-137 itself is made of military grade nuclear waste, meaning enriched military grade nuclear fuel that's passed its half-life due to nuclear fission during a nuclear explosion.

Since when is it my job to educate you about nuclear materials? When I'm responsible for my own continuing education, while your Islamic religion doesn't require you to learn anything else.
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Posted 10/21/09

DomFortress wrote:

Read it again, I was referring to the IAEA's regulated NPP as in the Consideration to Launch a Nuclear Power Program. Not the UN international treaty known as the NPT that you've been shielding Iran with.

If the Chinese government has nothing to do with how Iran obtained their equipments for nuclear enrichment program after the 2006 nuclear enrichment sanction on Iran by the UN. Then why did you complain here that:


Ryutai-Desk wrote:I've said it in my previous post that Russia has no power to stop Iran's intention to make Nuclear Power when they've fulfilled IAEA regulations. Well, even though Russia and China do not want Iran to enrich their nuclear, who the heck do they think they are? Want to put sanctions to Iran? Iran has been under tight sanction from begin with. After all, rights to have Nuclear plant is not through UN Founding Member, but through UN itself and procedure from IAEA. Could care less what Russia and China think when every country has right to have nuclear energy.

Then, UN should also questioning China for agreeing to cooperate with Iran. Why they let loose to Russia and China, while both nations also helping Iran to build Nuclear Facility? Because of political influence in UN Security Council? It's not fair, if UN only put sanctions to Iran, while Russia and China were working together.


Both China and Russia helped Iran to complete two nuclear power programs respectively in 1991 and 2006, when the planning of those NPP were already under the IAEA regulations. And since there's no such thing as an IAEA regulated nuclear enrichment program for member states under the NPT agreement, the 180 days notification is only for IAEA regulated nuclear power program. Especially when the IAEA modified their safeguard in 1991 and requested the NPT members of none-nuclear weapon states to report their nuclear program facilities during the planning stage. While only NPT members of nuclear weapon states were to voluntarily report their nuclear facilities during the planning stage.

Is Iran a nuclear weapon state under their NPT agreement, yes or no? If so, just what are their IAEA safeguard under Article III of their NPT agreement?

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.


This means that Iran never completely fulfill their NPT agreement, when they suspended the implementation of IAEA safeguard within their legislation in 2006; a suspension which the IAEA claimed never agreed upon.

How can radioactive isotopes, which are poisonous materials, can be used as preservatives? When food irradiation is a natural process of making dried foods using sunlight and dry air, or a simple microwave oven. Not to mention is the fact that the radioactive isotope used for commercial food irradiation is Cobalt-60. When the theoretical application of Cesium-137 itself is made of military grade nuclear waste, meaning enriched military grade nuclear fuel that's passed its half-life due to nuclear fission during a nuclear explosion.

Since when is it my job to educate you about nuclear materials? When I'm responsible for my own continuing education, while your Islamic religion doesn't require you to learn anything else.


❀=✿

Do you mind to point out which one you've been referring too? It'll be much easier to me, when you post it here rather make me read 25 pages again. While I've already explained it many times about NPT which is the main procedure for a country having a Nuclear for peaceful purpose.

❀=✿

I didn't said that. I said the opposite, that Chinese government absolutely involved in their agreement with Iran various times. Both of us have sources to prove it. In that statement, I merely saying the possible situation when Russia and China do not want to assist Iran in the future, thus they have no rights about it. Because a country should follows IAEA if they want to make a nuclear energy, not to Russia nor China.

❀=✿

I've explained about that again, The Code 3.1. of 1976 or 1990 version:

The "rules" Iran is accused of breaking are not vague, but rather spelled out in clear terms. In accordance with Article 42 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, and Code 3.1 of the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements (also known as the "additional protocol") to that agreement, Iran is obliged to inform the IAEA of any decision to construct a facility which would house operational centrifuges, and to provide preliminary design information about that facility, even if nuclear material had not been introduced. This would initiate a process of complementary access and design verification inspections by the IAEA.

This agreement was signed by Iran in December 2004. However, since the "additional protocol" has not been ratified by the Iranian parliament, and as such is not legally binding, Iran had viewed its implementation as being voluntary, and as such agreed to comply with these new measures as a confidence building measure more so than a mandated obligation.

In March 2007, Iran suspended the implementation of the modified text of Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part concerning the early provisions of design information. As such, Iran was reverting back to its legally-binding requirements of the original safeguards agreement, which did not require early declaration of nuclear-capable facilities prior to the introduction of nuclear material.

While this action is understandably vexing for the IAEA and those member states who are desirous of full transparency on the part of Iran, one cannot speak in absolute terms about Iran violating its obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.


http://washingtonindependent.com/60932/has-iran-actually-violated-any-specific-international-obligations-here

❀=✿

The Article III is true, while Iranian government had been agreed upon this matter, the Iranian Parliament never agreed about this new protocol. And this additional protocol is not legally binding and Iran viewed the implementation being voluntary, and as such agreed to comply with these new measures as a confidence building measure more so than a mandated obligation.
And...
Under the NPT, each state negotiates a safeguards agreement to the IAEA so the atomic watchdog can work out where and how to establish monitoring devices like cameras at declared facilities. “Iran’s specific safeguards agreement doesn’t say anything about the time limits for the provision of design information,” says Ivanka Barzashka, an analyst with the Federation of American Scientists’ Strategic Security Program. Specific time-frames for site or design disclosure typically occur in additional “subsidiary arrangements,” and usually provide for disclosure around 180 days before the introduction of nuclear material into a given facility.

After all, Iran had informed IAEA 18 month before they operating the new facility
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/89737/ahmadinejad-iran-informed-iaea-18-months-before-operating-new-facility.html

❀=✿

That's great, then that Theoretical Application of Cesium-137 should also applies to all non-nuclear weapon nations around the world. All countries which hold the nuclear plant never has any problem with it.

You don't know anything about religion, please stop saying irrelevant things.
Posted 10/22/09 , edited 10/22/09

Ryutai-Desk wrote:
❀=✿

Do you mind to point out which one you've been referring too?
It'll be much easier to me, when you post it here rather make me read 25 pages again. While I've already explained it many times about NPT which is the main procedure for a country having a Nuclear for peaceful purpose.

❀=✿

I didn't said that. I said the opposite, that Chinese government absolutely involved in their agreement with Iran various times. Both of us have sources to prove it. In that statement, I merely saying the possible situation when Russia and China do not want to assist Iran in the future, thus they have no rights about it. Because a country should follows IAEA if they want to make a nuclear energy, not to Russia nor China.

❀=✿

I've explained about that again, The Code 3.1. of 1976 or 1990 version:

The "rules" Iran is accused of breaking are not vague, but rather spelled out in clear terms. In accordance with Article 42 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, and Code 3.1 of the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements (also known as the "additional protocol") to that agreement, Iran is obliged to inform the IAEA of any decision to construct a facility which would house operational centrifuges, and to provide preliminary design information about that facility, even if nuclear material had not been introduced. This would initiate a process of complementary access and design verification inspections by the IAEA.

This agreement was signed by Iran in December 2004. However, since the "additional protocol" has not been ratified by the Iranian parliament, and as such is not legally binding, Iran had viewed its implementation as being voluntary, and as such agreed to comply with these new measures as a confidence building measure more so than a mandated obligation.

In March 2007, Iran suspended the implementation of the modified text of Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part concerning the early provisions of design information. As such, Iran was reverting back to its legally-binding requirements of the original safeguards agreement, which did not require early declaration of nuclear-capable facilities prior to the introduction of nuclear material.

While this action is understandably vexing for the IAEA and those member states who are desirous of full transparency on the part of Iran, one cannot speak in absolute terms about Iran violating its obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.


http://washingtonindependent.com/60932/has-iran-actually-violated-any-specific-international-obligations-here

❀=✿

The Article III is true, while Iranian government had been agreed upon this matter, the Iranian Parliament never agreed about this new protocol. And this additional protocol is not legally binding and Iran viewed the implementation being voluntary, and as such agreed to comply with these new measures as a confidence building measure more so than a mandated obligation.
And...
Under the NPT, each state negotiates a safeguards agreement to the IAEA so the atomic watchdog can work out where and how to establish monitoring devices like cameras at declared facilities. “Iran’s specific safeguards agreement doesn’t say anything about the time limits for the provision of design information,” says Ivanka Barzashka, an analyst with the Federation of American Scientists’ Strategic Security Program. Specific time-frames for site or design disclosure typically occur in additional “subsidiary arrangements,” and usually provide for disclosure around 180 days before the introduction of nuclear material into a given facility.

After all, Iran had informed IAEA 18 month before they operating the new facility
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/89737/ahmadinejad-iran-informed-iaea-18-months-before-operating-new-facility.html

❀=✿

That's great, then that Theoretical Application of Cesium-137 should also applies to all non-nuclear weapon nations around the world. All countries which hold the nuclear plant never has any problem with it.

You don't know anything about religion, please stop saying irrelevant things.

Then why Iran keep saying it's not their religion to have nuclear weapons? Just like their laws are based on their Islamic faith. This is Iran's nuclear ambition we're taking about.

Cesium-137 can only be made from a nuclear explosion due to a weapon grade enriched nuclear material going fission, not reactor grade nuclear fuel. Therefore Article II of the NPT clearly stated:

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
While Article IV stated:

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
Now tell me, what part of Article II of the NPT that you didn't understand, thereby you mistaken the acquirement for Cesium-137 justify Iran's nuclear ambition.

However, can you first explain why Iran still pretending to be working under IAEA's safeguard, when Iran "suspended the implementation of IAEA safeguard within their legislation in 2006", while Article III of NPT stated:

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
And I'll repeat myself again, that Iran can't use their none-nuclear weapon state status because they violated Article III of the NPT due to "Iran never completely fulfill their NPT agreement, when they suspended the implementation of IAEA safeguard within their legislation in 2006; a suspension which the IAEA claimed never agreed upon." In other words, Iran didn't violate the NPT because they can't violate something that they never fully agreed upon since 2006. Thus makes them a none nuclear weapon state in principle only; they only want the status qua of a none nuclear weapon state, not the responsibility.

Peaceful nuclear energy is electricity gained by converting the heat of a nuclear reactor fueled by reactor grade enriched nuclear materials, into kinetic energy usually done by heating water, which the water itself is used to propel the turbine of an electrical generator. That's the layman's term for a nuclear power plant constructed using the entire IAEA's regulated Consideration to Launch a Nuclear Power Program.
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DomFortress wrote:

Then why Iran keep saying it's not their religion to have nuclear weapons? Just like their laws are based on their Islamic faith. This is Iran's nuclear ambition we're taking about.

Cesium-137 can only be made from a nuclear explosion due to a weapon grade enriched nuclear material going fission, not reactor grade nuclear fuel. Therefore Article II of the NPT clearly stated:


Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.


While Article IV stated:

Article IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.


Now tell me, what part of Article II of the NPT that you didn't understand, thereby you mistaken the acquirement for Cesium-137 justify Iran's nuclear ambition.

However, can you first explain why Iran still pretending to be working under IAEA's safeguard, when Iran "suspended the implementation of IAEA safeguard within their legislation in 2006", while Article III of NPT stated:


Article III
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.


And I'll repeat myself again, that Iran can't use their none-nuclear weapon state status because they violated Article III of the NPT due to "Iran never completely fulfill their NPT agreement, when they suspended the implementation of IAEA safeguard within their legislation in 2006; a suspension which the IAEA claimed never agreed upon." In other words, Iran didn't violate the NPT because they can't violate something that they never fully agreed upon since 2006. Thus makes them a none nuclear weapon state in principle only; they only want the status qua of a none nuclear weapon state, not the responsibility.

Peaceful nuclear energy is electricity gained by converting the heat of a nuclear reactor fueled by reactor grade enriched nuclear materials, into kinetic energy usually done by heating water, which the water itself is used to propel the turbine of an electrical generator. That's the layman's term for a nuclear power plant constructed using the entire IAEA's regulated Consideration to Launch a Nuclear Power Program.




Because it's peaceful religion that didn't order its believer having weapon of mass destruction. Their Supreme Leader had said "We reject Nuclear Weapon in our country, because it's against our faith". He already stated it, now it's depend on how international listen to him.

Does Iran have that Cesium-137?
Article II:

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transfer whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.


The cooperation from Russia and China only to build Nuclear Energy, not weapon. If that the case, then why we haven't heard any violation coming from both those countries in the past? As there is no proof about it.

The "rules" Iran is accused of breaking are not vague, but rather spelled out in clear terms. In accordance with Article 42 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, and Code 3.1 of the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements (also known as the "additional protocol") to that agreement, Iran is obliged to inform the IAEA of any decision to construct a facility which would house operational centrifuges, and to provide preliminary design information about that facility, even if nuclear material had not been introduced. This would initiate a process of complementary access and design verification inspections by the IAEA.

This agreement was signed by Iran in December 2004. However, since the "additional protocol" has not been ratified by the Iranian parliament, and as such is not legally binding, Iran had viewed its implementation as being voluntary, and as such agreed to comply with these new measures as a confidence building measure more so than a mandated obligation.

According to an U.S. intelligence official who would only speak on background, “We’ve known about this facility for years. Over time, a clearer picture evolved of Iran’s intentions and activities at this covert site — one that, it turns out, wasn’t unknown to us.”

That’s still not the same thing as a broken obligation binding under international law. But the lack of a specific broken obligation, in turn, isn’t a reason to dismiss today’s disclosure.

Iran has complied with UN rules that require it to inform the world body's nuclear agency six months before a uranium enrichment facility becomes operational, NPR reported. Ahmadinejad said the new facility won't be operational for 18 months so Iran has not violated any requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Ali Akbar Salehi, the director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announced on Friday that the Islamic Republic is building a new nuclear fuel production plant. Salehi said the activities of the new facility, like the activities of the other Iranian nuclear facilities, are within the framework of the IAEA safeguards.

Iran’s Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi said on Saturday that the West should not make Iran regret cooperating with the IAEA beyond the country’s legal obligations.In a letter to the Vienna-based IAEA on Monday Iran informed of the UN nuclear watchdog of the facility's existence.

Ahmadinejad said enrichment facilities need not be disclosed until six months “before it is infused with gas” and operations begin.
Ahmadinejad said. “At the end of the day, this is a very ordinary facility that has been set up, and it's only in the beginning stages.”
Posted 10/22/09 , edited 10/22/09

Ryutai-Desk wrote:


DomFortress wrote:

Then why Iran keep saying it's not their religion to have nuclear weapons? Just like their laws are based on their Islamic faith. This is Iran's nuclear ambition we're taking about.

Cesium-137 can only be made from a nuclear explosion due to a weapon grade enriched nuclear material going fission, not reactor grade nuclear fuel. Therefore Article II of the NPT clearly stated:


Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.


While Article IV stated:

Article IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.


Now tell me, what part of Article II of the NPT that you didn't understand, thereby you mistaken the acquirement for Cesium-137 justify Iran's nuclear ambition.

However, can you first explain why Iran still pretending to be working under IAEA's safeguard, when Iran "suspended the implementation of IAEA safeguard within their legislation in 2006", while Article III of NPT stated:


Article III
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.


And I'll repeat myself again, that Iran can't use their none-nuclear weapon state status because they violated Article III of the NPT due to "Iran never completely fulfill their NPT agreement, when they suspended the implementation of IAEA safeguard within their legislation in 2006; a suspension which the IAEA claimed never agreed upon." In other words, Iran didn't violate the NPT because they can't violate something that they never fully agreed upon since 2006. Thus makes them a none nuclear weapon state in principle only; they only want the status qua of a none nuclear weapon state, not the responsibility.

Peaceful nuclear energy is electricity gained by converting the heat of a nuclear reactor fueled by reactor grade enriched nuclear materials, into kinetic energy usually done by heating water, which the water itself is used to propel the turbine of an electrical generator. That's the layman's term for a nuclear power plant constructed using the entire IAEA's regulated Consideration to Launch a Nuclear Power Program.




Because it's peaceful religion that didn't order its believer having weapon of mass destruction. Their Supreme Leader had said "We reject Nuclear Weapon in our country, because it's against our faith". He already stated it, now it's depend on how international listen to him.

Does Iran have that Cesium-137?
Article II:

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transfer whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.


The cooperation from Russia and China only to build Nuclear Energy, not weapon. If that the case, then why we haven't heard any violation coming from both those countries in the past? As there is no proof about it.

The "rules" Iran is accused of breaking are not vague, but rather spelled out in clear terms. In accordance with Article 42 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, and Code 3.1 of the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements (also known as the "additional protocol") to that agreement, Iran is obliged to inform the IAEA of any decision to construct a facility which would house operational centrifuges, and to provide preliminary design information about that facility, even if nuclear material had not been introduced. This would initiate a process of complementary access and design verification inspections by the IAEA.

This agreement was signed by Iran in December 2004. However, since the "additional protocol" has not been ratified by the Iranian parliament, and as such is not legally binding, Iran had viewed its implementation as being voluntary, and as such agreed to comply with these new measures as a confidence building measure more so than a mandated obligation.

According to an U.S. intelligence official who would only speak on background, “We’ve known about this facility for years. Over time, a clearer picture evolved of Iran’s intentions and activities at this covert site — one that, it turns out, wasn’t unknown to us.”

That’s still not the same thing as a broken obligation binding under international law. But the lack of a specific broken obligation, in turn, isn’t a reason to dismiss today’s disclosure.

Iran has complied with UN rules that require it to inform the world body's nuclear agency six months before a uranium enrichment facility becomes operational, NPR reported. Ahmadinejad said the new facility won't be operational for 18 months so Iran has not violated any requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Ali Akbar Salehi, the director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announced on Friday that the Islamic Republic is building a new nuclear fuel production plant. Salehi said the activities of the new facility, like the activities of the other Iranian nuclear facilities, are within the framework of the IAEA safeguards.

Iran’s Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi said on Saturday that the West should not make Iran regret cooperating with the IAEA beyond the country’s legal obligations.In a letter to the Vienna-based IAEA on Monday Iran informed of the UN nuclear watchdog of the facility's existence.

Ahmadinejad said enrichment facilities need not be disclosed until six months “before it is infused with gas” and operations begin.
Ahmadinejad said. “At the end of the day, this is a very ordinary facility that has been set up, and it's only in the beginning stages.”

And according to the IAEA safeguard, "only NPT members of nuclear weapon states were to voluntarily report their nuclear facilities during the planning stage".

So does this mean that Iran is fulfilling their NPT agreement as a none nuclear weapon state? Or are they a nuclear weapon state not agreed by their NPT agreement or the IAEA safeguard, when they didn't report their nuclear facilities during the planning stage just because they thought it was "voluntarily" for them to do so?
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DomFortress wrote:

And according to the IAEA safeguard, "only NPT members of nuclear weapon states were to voluntarily report their nuclear facilities during the planning stage".

So does this mean that Iran is fulfilling their NPT agreement as a none nuclear weapon state? Or are they a nuclear weapon state not agreed by their NPT agreement or the IAEA safeguard, when they didn't report their nuclear facilities during the planning stage just because they thought it was "voluntarily" for them to do so?


It's actually the contrary.


B.1 Paragraph 7
the Protocol Additional toAgreement(s) between State(s) and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540(Corr.)), referred to as the Model Additional Protocol. It is only for States with both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force that the Agency has the verification tools it needs to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
This is written and being referred to Iraq's nuclear

B.3 Paragraph 10
These so-called voluntary offer safeguards agreements (VOAs) generally follow the format of agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), but vary in the scope of materials and facilities covered, e.g. excluding those with national security significance. VOAs also foresee the possibility of withdrawing such material and facilities from safeguards. The Agency implements safeguards in such States: (i) to test innovative safeguards methods, or to give the Agency experience that it might not otherwise gain in safeguarding advanced nuclear fuel cycle facilities; and (ii) to fulfill expectations of non-nuclear-weapon States that some facilities in nuclear-weapon States are subject to safeguards.
Iran will fulfill this on Oct 25.

The Agency also applies safeguards in nuclear-weapon States as a result of legal obligations arising from other safeguards agreements and for efficiency reasons (e.g. to verify transfers of nuclear material when it is more cost effective to verify such transfers in the exporting, nuclear-weapon State than in the receiving, non-nuclear-weapon State).
This paragraph stated Nuclear Weapon States are obligate to follow safeguards agreement.



Actually what is the safeguard?

C. Paragraph 12
The traditional measures of the Agency’s safeguards system, which remain at its core, include verification activities performed at nuclear facilities and at other locations where nuclear material is customarily used. Under the authority conferred upon the Agency in comprehensive safeguards agreements, these activities were originally focused on whether information on facility design, and on the type(s) and quantity(ies) of nuclear material present, had been declared accurately by the State, the aim being to provide assurance that facilities were not misused, and that the declared nuclear material was not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.


Iran has allowed IAEA to inspect their nuclear facility in 2 days, as long as Iran provides IAEA their report, there's no problem. So, there's no violation in here. And the reason IAEA changed its safeguard, was because of Iraq's nuclear, not Iran's that never being a secret since 1980.

Safeguard Objective:

D. Paragraph 18
The Agency has specific objectives relevant to each type of safeguards agreement. For comprehensive safeguards agreements, the overall purpose of which is set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of INFCIRC/153 (i.e. to ensure that source or special fissionable material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices), the technical objective is “the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection” (INFCIRC/153, para. 28)). This technical objective is the basis for detailed and specific inspection goals for each facility inspected under comprehensive safeguards agreements.


Iran had informed IAEA 18 months before they operating the new facility, so there's no problem.
Posted 10/22/09 , edited 10/22/09

Ryutai-Desk wrote:


DomFortress wrote:

And according to the IAEA safeguard, "only NPT members of nuclear weapon states were to voluntarily report their nuclear facilities during the planning stage".

So does this mean that Iran is fulfilling their NPT agreement as a none nuclear weapon state? Or are they a nuclear weapon state not agreed by their NPT agreement or the IAEA safeguard, when they didn't report their nuclear facilities during the planning stage just because they thought it was "voluntarily" for them to do so?


It's actually the contrary.


B.1 Paragraph 7
the Protocol Additional toAgreement(s) between State(s) and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540(Corr.)), referred to as the Model Additional Protocol. It is only for States with both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force that the Agency has the verification tools it needs to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
This is written and being referred to Iraq's nuclear

B.3 Paragraph 10
These so-called voluntary offer safeguards agreements (VOAs) generally follow the format of agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), but vary in the scope of materials and facilities covered, e.g. excluding those with national security significance. VOAs also foresee the possibility of withdrawing such material and facilities from safeguards. The Agency implements safeguards in such States: (i) to test innovative safeguards methods, or to give the Agency experience that it might not otherwise gain in safeguarding advanced nuclear fuel cycle facilities; and (ii) to fulfill expectations of non-nuclear-weapon States that some facilities in nuclear-weapon States are subject to safeguards.

Iran will fulfill this on Oct 25.

The Agency also applies safeguards in nuclear-weapon States as a result of legal obligations arising from other safeguards agreements and for efficiency reasons (e.g. to verify transfers of nuclear material when it is more cost effective to verify such transfers in the exporting, nuclear-weapon State than in the receiving, non-nuclear-weapon State).
This paragraph stated Nuclear Weapon States are obligate to follow safeguards agreement.



Actually what is the safeguard?

C. Paragraph 12
The traditional measures of the Agency’s safeguards system, which remain at its core, include verification activities performed at nuclear facilities and at other locations where nuclear material is customarily used. Under the authority conferred upon the Agency in comprehensive safeguards agreements, these activities were originally focused on whether information on facility design, and on the type(s) and quantity(ies) of nuclear material present, had been declared accurately by the State, the aim being to provide assurance that facilities were not misused, and that the declared nuclear material was not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.


Iran has allowed IAEA to inspect their nuclear facility in 2 days, as long as Iran provides IAEA their report, there's no problem. So, there's no violation in here. And the reason IAEA changed its safeguard, was because of Iraq's nuclear, not Iran's that never being a secret since 1980.

Safeguard Objective:

D. Paragraph 18
The Agency has specific objectives relevant to each type of safeguards agreement. For comprehensive safeguards agreements, the overall purpose of which is set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of INFCIRC/153 (i.e. to ensure that source or special fissionable material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices), the technical objective is “the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection” (INFCIRC/153, para. 28)). This technical objective is the basis for detailed and specific inspection goals for each facility inspected under comprehensive safeguards agreements.


Iran had informed IAEA 18 months before they operating the new facility, so there's no problem.

Wrong. For that's not the safeguard applied for none nuclear weapon state like Iran, when you cheery-picked that information from page 3 of the 19 pages long safeguard, entitled Voluntary Offer Agreement(VOA).

This is what you left out:

B.3. Voluntary Offer Agreements
The NPT does not require the nuclear-weapon States to accept safeguards provided for in that Treaty. However, all five have concluded safeguards agreements under which they have voluntarily offered nuclear material and/or facilities from which the Agency may select to apply safeguards. These so-called voluntary offer safeguards agreements (VOAs) generally follow the format of agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), but vary in the scope of materials and facilities covered, e.g. excluding those with national security significance. VOAs also foresee the possibility of withdrawing such material and facilities from safeguards. The Agency implements safeguards in such States: (i) to test innovative safeguards methods, or to give the Agency experience that it might not otherwise gain in safeguarding advanced nuclear fuel cycle facilities; and (ii) to fulfil expectations of non-nuclear-weapon States that some facilities in nuclear-weapon States are subject to safeguards. The Agency also applies safeguards in nuclear-weapon States as a result of legal obligations arising from other safeguards agreements and for efficiency reasons(e.g. to verify transfers of nuclear material when it is more cost effective to verify such transfers in the exporting, nuclear-weapon State than in the receiving, non-nuclear-weapon State).


This is the additional protocols:

B.4. Additional Protocols
11. As stated in paragraph 7 above, the Model Additional Protocol marked the culmination of the major safeguards strengthening measures of the 1990s. It equips the Agency with important new tools to verify the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations under comprehensive safeguards agreements. Designed for States with a safeguards agreement with the Agency, the Protocol is contributing to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives.


And this is the Model Additional Protocol:

7. Although the Agency has the authority, under comprehensive safeguards agreements, to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the tools available to it to do so, under such agreements, are limited. This realisation set the stage for safeguards strengthening efforts culminating in the approval, by the Board of Governors, of a model protocol additional to safeguards agreements which provides the Agency with such tools: the Protocol Additional to Agreement(s) between State(s) and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)), referred to as the Model Additional Protocol. It is only for States with both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force that the Agency has the verification tools it needs to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

15. As for the measures requiring additional legal authority, a special committee of the Board (Committee 24) was established to negotiate a standardized model for such authority. They worked on the basis of a draft developed by the Secretariat, in consultation with the Member States. The result was the Model Additional Protocol, which was approved by the Board on 15 May 1997, and subsequently published as INFCIRC/540 (Corr.) Additional protocols for States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force must include all of the measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol. To promote widespread adherence to additional protocols as a contribution to global non-proliferation initiatives, the Board also requested the Director General to negotiate additional protocols with States that have other types of safeguards agreements. Such States were asked to accept those measures of the Model Additional Protocol that they believe will contribute to its non-proliferation and efficiency aims.


While this is the Model Additional Protocol verification tool within the Additional Protocols, which Iran failed to implement into their legislation:

Early strengthening measures 1991-1993
- State provision of design information on new facilities or on changes in existing facilities as soon as the State authorities decide to construct, to authorize construction or to modify a facility; and the Agency’s continuing right to verify the design information over the life of a facility, including decommissioning.


So once again I ask: does this mean that Iran is fulfilling their NPT agreement as a none nuclear weapon state? Or are they a nuclear weapon state not agreed by their NPT agreement or the IAEA safeguard, when they didn't report their nuclear facilities during the planning stage just because they thought it was "voluntarily" for them to do so? When Article III of NPT stated:

Article III
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
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just let them be...
soon or later...
USA is gonna use a new kind of super bomb
and finish them all...
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Sorry, gone for awhile during weekend. Shall we continue?


DomFortress wrote:

Wrong. For that's not the safeguard applied for none nuclear weapon state like Iran, when you cheery-picked that information from page 3 of the 19 pages long safeguard, entitled Voluntary Offer Agreement(VOA).

This is what you left out:

B.3. Voluntary Offer Agreements


Yeah, I didn't put the first sentence because in the next few sentences, they (nuclear weapon states) have to accept the safeguards from IAEA. It's already mentioned in Article I that Nuclear Weapon States also have to follows IAEA safeguards, if not then this treaty is flawed. The reasons why India keeps rejecting to sign NPT because of this. As Gamad Abdul Nasser stated :

Gamal Abdel Nasser once said "basically they did whatever they wanted to do before the introduction of NPT and then devised it to prevent others from doing what they had themselves been doing before". In addition, some argue that the NWS have not fully complied, in practice, with their commitments mentioned in NPT.

Article VI of the treaty requires NPT parties to "pursue negotiations" on an end to the arms race, "nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament." Yet thousands of nuclear weapons remain, some on high alert, long after the end of the cold war. In January 2002, a report by the Defense Department following the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review recommended the development of nuclear weapons designed to destroy hardened and deeply-buried targets, but the resulting Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator never gained full Congressional support and was canceled in 2005. The representative of Ghana, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group said disarmament and non-proliferation were complementary and mutually reinforcing and that, "Without tangible progress in disarmament, the current emphasis on non-proliferation cannot be sustained.


This is one of many criticism and controversy around the treaty about Weapon Nuclear States. Pretty contrary when it only said, the 'so-called voluntary safeguards agreements' only apply to NWS. I've highlighted those contraries above. We know who controls UN, after all.


DomFortress wrote:

This is the additional protocols:


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_program_of_Iran
Iran also minimizes the significance of the IAEA's inability to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, arguing the IAEA has only drawn such conclusions in a subset of states that have ratified and implemented the Additional Protocol. The IAEA has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran,but not the absence of undeclared activities. According to the IAEA's Safeguards Statement for 2007, of the 82 states where both NPT safeguards and an Additional Protocol are implemented, the IAEA had found no indication of undeclared nuclear activity in 47 states, while evaluations of possible undeclared nuclear activity remained ongoing in 35 states.

Iran ceased implementation of the Additional Protocol and all other cooperation with the IAEA beyond that required under its safeguards agreement after the IAEA Board of Governors decided to report its safeguards non-compliance to the UN Security Council in February 2006. Iran insisted that such cooperation had been "voluntary," but on December 26, 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1737, invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which among other things required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA, "beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol."

The IAEA reported on November 19, 2008 that, while it is "able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran," it "has not been able to make substantive progress" on "key remaining issues of serious concern" because of a "lack of cooperation by Iran." Iran has maintained that the Security Council's engagement in "the issue of the peaceful nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran" are unlawful and malicious.Iran also argues that the UN Security Council resolutions demanding a suspension of enrichment constitute a violation of Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which recognizes the inalienable right of signatory nations to nuclear technology "for peaceful purposes."

However, Iran agreed to implement the Additional Protocol under the terms of the October 2003 Tehran agreement and its successor, the November 2004 Paris agreement, and did so for 2 years before withdrawing from the Paris agreement in early 2006 following the breakdown of negotiations with the EU-3. Since then, Iran has offered not only to ratify the Additional Protocol, but to implement transparency measures on its nuclear program that exceed the Additional Protocol, as long as its right to operate an enrichment program is recognized.

The UN Security Council, however, insists that Iran must suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and the United States explicitly ruled out the possibility that it would allow Iran to produce its own nuclear fuel, even under intense international inspection.

Iran had signed this in 2003. According to IAEA Safeguards System :



56. To conclude that there is no indication of diversion of declared nuclear material, the Secretariat evaluates the results of its verification activities to determine that:
• nuclear material flows and inventories are as declared;
facility design is in accordance with the declared design and consistent with the
corresponding safeguards approach;

• facility operations are as declared (e.g., though the review of surveillance records);
• facility material accountancy systems conform to prescribed standards;
• the facility operator’s measurement systems perform to international standards and are in
good statistical control over time; and
• all anomalies are resolved or otherwise addressed.


As we know, Iran had failed to met verification for their nuclear facility in design and only informed IAEA 18 months before they operating the nuclear because they wanted to prevent US intervention for political reasons. After the Islamic Revolution, the seizure of U.S. hostages, and termination of diplomatic relations in 1979, U.S. opposition to Iran's nuclear efforts increased during the 1980s and 1990s. Washington blocked nuclear deals between Iran and Argentina, China, and Russia. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Iranian ambassador to the United Nations, wrote in Columbia University's Journal of International Affairs in 2007 that Washington's shift away from supporting Iran's nuclear energy program left Tehran with little choice but to be discreet in its nuclear activities (PDF). "To avoid the [U.S.-led] restrictions and impediments," Zarif writes, "Iran refrained for disclosing the details of its programs."

We know, just because of this 'voluntary' safeguards which is really vague and being pressured by US. Iran had been put tight sanctions pressured by US and west countries, such as:


* Weapons development. The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (October 23, 1992)

* Trade and Investment. On April 30, 1995, President Bill Clinton announced a comprehensive ban on U.S. trade and investment in Iran, a move codified by Executive Order 12959.

* Nuclear materials. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA) was aimed at denying Iran access to materials to further its nuclear program by sanctioning non-U.S. business investment in Iran's energy sector.

* Financial dealings. The U.S. Treasury Department administers a vast array of financial sanctions against Iran.

* Assets. Following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, President Bush authored Executive Order 13224 (PDF), freezing the assets of entities determined to be supporting international terrorism. This list includes dozens of individuals, organizations, and financial institutions in Iran. Over the years Washington has sanctioned dozens more individuals and Iranian institutions, including banks, defense contractors, and the Revolutionary Guard Corps.

* Refined gasoline (future). Both Congress and the Obama administration are considering measures (Reuters) that would penalize domestic and foreign companies for selling refined gasoline to Iran, or for supplying equipment in Iran's bid to increase its refining capacity.



Now look at the stance of UN, Iran and Neutral countries :

United Nations position: The permanent Security Council members, including Russia and China, have declared their intentions to prevent Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction because of its belligerent rhetoric towards the West and Israel since the Iranian Revolution. In principle, the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have confirmed Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Iranian stance: Iran wants to build a network of nuclear power plants with a capacity for 20,000 MW by 2020. Iran has referred to its inalienable right to develop nuclear technology for civilian and peaceful purposes under the NPT to justify its position. The Supreme Leader of Iran has stated in a fatwa that possession and use of nuclear weapons is "anti-Islamic". Iranian officials have insisted that they have no intention to develop nuclear weapons. This point has been strongly questioned by the West because uranium enrichment is a dual-use technology.

Iran has dismissed the sanctions and said it did not intend to suspend its enrichment programme. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki told the Security Council after the vote: "The world must know – and it does – that even the harshest political and economic sanctions or other threats are far too weak to coerce the Iranian nation to retreat from their legal and legitimate demands." He added: "Suspension is neither an option nor a solution".

Non-Aligned Movement's position: Iran has reminded the Security Council of the Non-Aligned Movement's support for its civilian nuclear programme and its opposition to any military attack against Iran. This declaration by the Non-Aligned Movement, at the summit level, represents a majority of 118 countries at the United Nations and 55% of the world population.

Iran also has stated, they do not want to fulfill US demands to halt its enrichment of Nuclear before they talks because of various reasons:

Economic reasons: Iran has stated that its programme is motivated by economic needs and scientific progress only. Iran has said its large petroleum reserves will inevitably extinguish, given its increasing domestic energy consumption and because of its oil exports. Iran has referred to U.S. government reports from the time of the Shah and independent U.S. estimates as recent as 2006 to justify its position.[19] Iran has also referred to Russia's recent decision to withhold fuel delivery for its nuclear power plant as an additional reason why it cannot rely on other countries for its nuclear fuel needs.

Financial investment: Iran has said it has spent too much money - over ten billion U.S. dollars in the past 30 years - on its civilian nuclear programme to give it up now. Furthermore, it has argued that suspension is a way for the West to undermine Iran's independence and progress. If its rights are not respected by the Security Council, Iran has threatened to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran has justified its uranium enrichment programme because it has plans to construct more nuclear power plants in the future.


DomFortress wrote:

So once again I ask: does this mean that Iran is fulfilling their NPT agreement as a none nuclear weapon state? Or are they a nuclear weapon state not agreed by their NPT agreement or the IAEA safeguard, when they didn't report their nuclear facilities during the planning stage just because they thought it was "voluntarily" for them to do so? When Article III of NPT stated:


Iran had failed to met the safeguards based only design of its nuclear facility. That's why they had been put tight sanctions for violating this single additional protocol, and they violated it to avoid the [U.S.-led] restrictions and impediments. After Iranian evolutions, US and Iran don't have any relations until now. That's the reason, why US is in such paranoia.

Therefore, you can't draw conclusion based on that only.

55.) To be able to draw a conclusion that all nuclear material in a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol remained in peaceful activities in a given year, the Secretariat must conclude that there is no indication of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities (including no misuse of declared facilities or LOFs) and no indication of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole.


Also Chapter H.2 H.3 H.4 and H.5 said, the Secretariat of Agency can't draw conclusion that stated a country have nuclear weapon:


The conclusion drawn relates only to no indication of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities (including the non-misuse of declared facilities or LOFs). This conclusion, where applicable, is reported in the Safeguards Statement in the SIR as a conclusion that the declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.


IAEA, as UN watchdog in matter regarding nuclear programme and its rights to have nuclear technology can't draw any conclusion based on misleading propaganda, even the specific country has not being put any safeguards.

For that reasons, Iran has proposed solutions
Iran's proposed solution


Comprehensive negotiations:
Iran has agreed to hold further talks, without the precondition to halt its uranium enrichment programme. The United States has opposed this, even though it has agreed to hold direct talks relating to other subjects like the war in Iraq. In 2003, Iran was known to have made a similar confidential proposal to the United States through the Swiss Embassy in Tehran. Switzerland is the US protecting power in Iran since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The United States is said to have rejected those discussions, at that time.

International consortium:
Iran is ready to consider the creation of an international consortium for uranium enrichment based in Iran as a solution to the current standoff at the Security Council. In April 2007, Iran declared it had reached the early stage in industrial nuclear fuel production following the installation of more than a thousand centrifuges at the Natanz underground facility. Iran has declared it was planning to install 50,000 more centrifuges in the future. In 2005, Iran inaugurated a uranium conversion facility in Isfahan, and a heavy water production plant in Arak in 2006. All declared Iranian installations are under the strict supervision of the IAEA.


So once again I ask : Does this mean Iran has nuclear weapon just because of their little corporation to these Additional Protocol and VoA? While there's no indication for such statement based on false accusation and political reasons? I ask for the proof and evidence Iran has those nuclear WEAPON, not for their lack of cooperation and such.

Just look at this report :Iran’s nuclear threat is a lie

On 16 September, Newsweek disclosed that the major US intelligence agencies had reported to the White House that Iran's "nuclear status" had not changed since the National Intelligence Estimate of November 2007, which stated with "high confidence" that Iran had halted in 2003 the programme it was alleged to have developed. The International Atomic Energy Agency has backed this, time and again.

The current propaganda derives from Obama's announcement that the US is scrapping missiles stationed on Russia's border. This serves to cover the fact that the number of US missile sites is actually expanding in Europe and the "redundant" missiles are being redeployed on ships. The game is to mollify Russia into joining, or not obstructing, the US campaign against Iran. "President Bush was right," said Obama, "that Iran's ballistic missile programme poses a significant threat [to Europe and the US]." That Iran would contemplate a suicidal attack on the US is preposterous. The threat, as ever, is one-way, with the world's superpower virtually ensconced on Iran's borders.

As one of the original signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has been a consistent advocate of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. In contrast, Israel has never agreed to an IAEA inspection, and its nuclear weapons plant at Dimona remains an open secret. Armed with as many as 200 active nuclear warheads, Israel "deplores" UN resolutions calling on it to sign the NPT, just as it deplored the recent UN report charging it with crimes against humanity in Gaza, just as it maintains a world record for violations of international law. It gets away with this because great power grants it immunity.
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Posted 12/18/09 , edited 12/18/09
I would like to bring this thread back and add some new information on the issue. Iran has tested a new missile capable of reaching parts of Europe and Israel. Here are two articles, one from Jpost and the other from Al-Jezeera.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1260930883370&pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/12/2009121674255591274.html

Also. Ahmadinejad has said that America is trying to stop the coming of the apocalyptic Imam. http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/12/07/93422.html http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,579640,00.html

I believe the world needs to be MUCH tougher on Iran and act militarily if things don't improve. This man is the Hitler of our day, and the world is treating him gently like they treated Hitler. Ahmadinejad is a crazy terrorist who believes that America is the great satan, and Israel is the little satan. In his beliefs there is an imam in the bottom of a well that will rise up to start the Islamic apocalypse once America and Israel are destroyed... This guy is a loony fool with access to nuclear weapons! This is a shady theocratic regime that suppresses democracy and pushes for an apocalyptic future, the Iranian government has not complied with the international community regarding their nuclear program and has repeatedly slammed the Jews and vowed in their leader's own words to "wipe Israel off the map." Something must be done to stop this and it must be done sooner then later. I mean during a controversial time they are testing missile and building a new nuclear facility...

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1260930897825&pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull We can't sit back and pass sympathy on this foolish barbarian.
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To be frankly honest, Ahmadinejad doesn't even have control over his country. In fact, the Imams have the control and there is nothing that Ahmadinejad can talk about. If you guys want to stop Iran, go ahead, but i must look at the other way to say that Iran is a weak country and it HAS a purpose on creating nuclear weapons. It isn't just creating it for their own selfishness. Israel and Iran where on bad terms forever and they needed to defend themselves and the government of Iran doesn't want to at all nuke an entire country. Neither the government or the people want that. While United-States just tries to convince people that Iranians are evil and such, Iranians don't think like that AT ALL and they do not want war with Israel. Not because they are weak, actually, Iran isn't weak at all, and is in fact more powerful than a lot of other countries, but because the people don't want another war and they are actually very peaceful, also the government is like that. I already bent to Iran and I'm going over there again in 2 weeks because I know what a great country it is and I must say, it's even more fun to be there than the country I live in myself, if you put aside the government.
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